Textual evidences in Islam were and are the focus area of jurisprudent scholars as they obey Allah orders by extracting the islamic rulings from those evidences in order to worship Allah in the most evidence-based way. While the literal textual evidences lead to different rulings, the interpretation of those evidences leads to either an agreement or a disagreement. Therefore this research focuses on one type of disagreement concepts which's the concept of exception among Ibadi scholars. This research discusses the concept from two perspectives. First, the origin of this concept in Ibadi literature and their understanding of it. Second, the application of the concept by extracting the branches that this concept is applied on and the branches that this concept is not applied on or controversial with other schools. The research aims to answer two main questions. First, how Ibadi scholars extracted the concept and how it was originated? Second, did Ibadus apply the concept in jurisprudence branches as same as it was supposed to applied when it was originated initially? And if there is a misapplication identified, what is the reason behind it? The researcher followed an inductive and analytical methodologies in order to come up with a result that matches the origination and the application of the concept among Ibadi scholars. The results of this research are as follow: 1- Ibadi scholars did not clearly identified the concept as a sole identified concept. It is safe to say that they define it generally as: the overruling of general ruling in the excepted entities. 2- Ibadi scholars appreciate that the concept can be abrogated with its origin, or without its origin but the origin cannot be abrogated without the concept. They also only identified that the concept itself can abrogate a ruling if the abrogated ruling is not a definite essential ruling by certainty and meaning. 3- Ibadi scholars applied the concept in their jurisprudence in the same way as they extracted and originated it. The applied the concept according at the same level of certainty of the discussed evidence, so the resulted ruling was in the same in the level of strength in use as the evidence that it was applied on. Ibadi scholars did not apply the concept when its conditional terms were not met nor when there was a stronger concept used in the case.